美国真的在衰落吗？
英国《金融时报》专栏作家吉迪恩�6�1拉赫曼(Gideon Rachman)
2008-12-31
如果你想讨论美国衰落的问题，德克萨斯农业机械大学(Texas A&M)似乎不像一个好地方。相对于美国的其它普通院校，这所大学把更多的毕业生直接输送到了军队。该校的军官训练团行走在校园里的时候，总会身着笔挺的制服，脚穿齐膝的皮靴，彼此用轻快的“你好”(howdy，how do you do的方言)打招呼。烦恼的自省和信心危机不是德克萨斯人的特点。
但最近，德克萨斯农业机械大学斯考克罗夫特国际事务学院(Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs)主办了一次会议，旨在讨论美国情报部门最新提出的明显悲观的全球观点。美国国家情报委员会(National Intelligence Council)监督美国复杂的情报机构体系，该委员会每4年发表一份全球趋势报告，递交美国新总统。
这份发表于11月20日的最新报告引起了全球的关注。英国《卫报》(Guardian)的头版赫然写着“2025年：美国统治地位的结束”。这一次，这个标题基本准确。就像美国国家情报委员会坦率指出的那样，新报告和4年前发表的报告之间“最具戏剧性的区别”在于，新报告现在预测，“美国将在全球事件中发挥重要作用，不过美国被视为许多全球参与者之一”。4年前发表的报告曾预测“美国将继续占据统治地位”。
美国国家情报委员会的报告令人警醒，因为它来自美国安全部门的核心。但这是美国更为广泛的学术趋势的一部分：“新衰落主义”(new declinism)。这一情绪标志着彻底告别布什(Bush)时代的盛气凌人和“单极时刻”。报告开头的假设就是，尽管美国仍是全球最为强大的国家，但已进入相对衰落过程。
三大事态滋长了新衰落主义。首先，伊拉克和阿富汗战争突显出，美国的绝对军事优势没有自动转化为政治胜利。其次，中国和印度的崛起表明，美国作为全球最大经济体的日子已屈指可数。第三，此次金融危机支持了这种看法，即美国正入不敷出，美国模式出现了严重问题。
表达这一悲观情绪的不是别人，正是布伦特�6�1斯考克罗夫特(General Brent Scowcroft)将军，他回到以他的名字命名的这所学院，在美国国家情报委员会会议上致开幕词。斯考克罗夫特将军指出，冷战结束后，美国发现自己是一个强大的世界大国，这 “令人陶醉”。但“我们动用这一实力一段时期后就意识到，这些都是短暂的”。
这种对美国实力局限性的新认识，反映在了很多新书和文章中。最具影响力的可能是法里德�6�1扎卡里亚(Fareed Zakaria)的《后美国世界》(The Post-American World)，据说这是巴拉克�6�1奥巴马(Barack Obama)今年读过的唯一一本关于外交事务的著作。尽管扎卡里亚竭力指出中国、印度和“其它国家”的崛起不会对美国构成威胁，但不可避免的结论是，布什时代是美国实力的最高峰。
另外一本抓住这种新情绪的有影响力的著作，是安德鲁�6�1巴塞维奇(Andrew Bacevich)的《实力极限》(The Limits of Power)。巴塞维奇教授是一位保守派历史学家和退伍军人，他的儿子在伊拉克战争中阵亡。他提出：“美国实力……不足以实现由狂妄与伪善带来的野心。”美国外交关系委员会(Council of Foreign Relations)主席理查德�6�1哈斯(Richard Haass)堪称美国外交政策部门资格最老的人士，他是另一个主张“美国的单极时刻已结束”的重要人物。
但就像达特茅斯学院(Dartmouth College)的威廉�6�1沃尔福斯(William Wohlforth)在美国国家情报委员会会议上所提醒的那样，美国以前也经历过衰落主义时期。现在的辩论让人回忆起1988年保罗�6�1肯尼迪(Paul Kennedy)的《大国的兴衰》(The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers)所引发的争论。肯尼迪教授认为，以前的大国都败于“帝国过度扩张”，这一看法当时在美国引起极大反响，当时许多人对里根(Reagan)时代的预算赤字以及日本日益壮大的经济实力表示担心。
然而，冷战得胜、日本经济增长10年一蹶不振以及克林顿时期高科技产业的蓬勃发展，令肯尼迪教授代表的“衰落主义”迅速消失。这为美国信心的复兴和布什总统任期内的狂妄自大奠定了舞台。
现在回忆起来有点奇怪，但在冷战初期，确实有些人担心，苏联可能超过美国。此外，越南战争引发了美国人的信心危机，当时理查德�6�1尼克松(Richard Nixon)警告他的同胞们，他们看上去可能像是一个“可怜、无助的巨人”。上世纪80年代，日本成为美国霸主地位的最新挑战者。现在轮到了中国。
沃尔福斯教授辩称，美国国家情报委员会的报告反映了“一种情绪的变化，而非根本层面的实力评估的变化”。正如他所言，崛起的强国并非总能完成崛起过程，经济实力也并非总会转化为政治实力。
确实如此。但我们仍有理由认为，新的衰落主义可能建立在比之前版本更为健全的基础上。中国拥有持续且富有活力的经济增长的记录，而苏联从未有过。而且，与日本这样的相对小国相比，中国的规模令其成为一位更可信的挑战者。
这一次确实感觉不同。不过，事情总是如此，不是吗？
译者/梁艳裳
Is America's new declinism for real?
Gideon Rachman 2008-12-31
Texas A&M is not the obvious place to pick if you want to discuss American decline. The university sends more of its graduates straight into the military than any other civilian college in the US. Its officer training corps prowl the campus in crisply pressed uniforms and knee-high leather boots, greeting each other with brisk “howdys”. Agonised introspection and crises of confidence are not Texan traits.
But last week the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at Texas A&M hosted a conference designed to discuss the latest, markedly gloomy world view issued by America's intelligence establishment. Every four years the National Intelligence Council – which oversees America's baroque collection of intelligence agencies – releases a global trends report, which is given to the new president.
The latest report, published on November 20, has made headlines around the world. The front page of Britain's Guardian newspaper shouted “2025: the end of US dominance”. For once, the headline is broadly accurate. As the NIC frankly notes, “the most dramatic difference” between the new report and the one issued four years ago is that it now foresees “a world in which the US plays a prominent role in global events, but the US is seen as one among many global actors”. The report issued four years ago had projected “continuing US dominance”.
The NIC report has made people sit up because it comes from the heart of the US security establishment. But it is part of a broader intellectual trend in America: a “new declinism”. This mood marks a complete break with the aggressive confidence of the Bush years and the “unipolar moment”. Its starting assumption is that America, while still the most powerful country in the world, is in relative decline.
Three developments have fed the new declinism. First, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have underlined that US military supremacy does not automatically translate into political victory. Second, the rise of China and India suggest that America's days as the world's largest economy are numbered. Third, the financial crisis has fed the notion that the US is living beyond its means and that something is badly wrong with the American model.
This gloomy mood was captured by the opening address to the NIC's conference, given by none other than General Brent Scowcroft himself, returning to the institute named after him. The general noted that the US had found itself in a position of huge global power after the end of the cold war, which was “heady stuff”. But “we exercised that power for a while only to realise that it was ephemeral”.
This new awareness of the constraints on American power is reflected in a number of new books and articles. The most influential is probably Fareed Zakaria's The Post-American World, which is said to be the only book on foreign affairs read by Barack Obama this year. Although Mr Zakaria strives to present the rise of China, India and “the rest” as unthreatening to the US, the inescapable conclusion is that the Bush years marked the apogee of American power.
Another influential book to capture this new mood is Andrew Bacevich's The Limits of Power. Professor Bacevich, a conservative historian and military veteran whose son was killed in the Iraq war, argues: “American power . . . is inadequate to the ambitions to which hubris and sanctimony have given rise.” Richard Haass, who as head of the Council of Foreign Relations is arguably the doyen of the foreign policy establishment, is another important voice arguing: “The United States' unipolar moment is over.”
But as William Wohlforth of Dartmouth College reminded the NIC conference in Texas last week, America has been through phases of declinism before. The current debate is reminiscent of the arguments unleashed by the publication in 1988 of Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Professor Kennedy's argument that previous great powers had succumbed to “imperial over-stretch” resonated in the US at a time when many were worried by Reagan-era budget deficits and Japan's growing economic power .
But the “declinism” represented by Prof Kennedy was quickly dissipated by victory in the cold war, Japan's lost decade of economic growth and the high-tech boom of the Clinton years. All this set the stage for a resurgence of American confidence and the swagger of the Bush presidency.
Odd as it is to recall now, there were people during the early phases of the cold war who were also genuinely worried that the USSR might outperform the US. There was also a national crisis of confidence caused by the Vietnam war, when Richard Nixon warned his fellow countrymen they risked looking like a “pitiful, helpless giant”. In the 1980s, Japan became the new challenger to American supremacy. Now it is China.
Professor Wohlforth argues that the NIC report reflects “a mood change, not a change in the underlying assessment of power”. As he says, rising powers do not always complete their climb and economic strength does not always translate into political power.
This is all true. But there are still reasons for thinking that the new declinism may be more soundly based than its predecessors. China has a record of sustained and dynamic economic growth that the Soviet Union was never capable of. And China's sheer size makes it a more plausible challenger than a relatively small nation, such as Japan.
This time it really does feel different. But then it always does, does it not?
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